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Abstract 
 
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction 
industry in the European Union is still a highly inefficient and inconsistently configured system 
for  cross-border transactions. This paper analyzes the functions performed, the institutions 
involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure in the industry. 
Of particular  interest are microeconomic incentives of the main players that can be in 
contradiction to social welfare. We develop a framework and analyze three consistent systems for 
the securities transaction industry  in the EU that offer superior efficiency than the current, 
inefficient arrangement. Some policy advice is given to select the 'best' system for the Single 
European Financial Market. 
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 1 Introduction
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction industry
in the European Union is still a highly ine±cient and inconsistently con¯gured system for cross-border
transactions. Many EU politicians eagerly promote the completion of the Single European Market,
but - few exceptions aside - the industry structure still resembles closely the former fragmented market
structure of largely independent institutions operating along national lines. This causes higher costs
in the handling of cross-border securities1 which ultimately translates into higher costs of capital - a
signi¯cant competitive disadvantage for European ¯rms compared to companies in the USA.
Industry experts point at several aspects that impede the realization of an e±cient securities transac-
tion system. While trading is widely seen as e±cient, clearing and settlement processes across di®erent
countries are still too costly. The fragmented industry structure, which does not allow for capturing the
signi¯cant bene¯ts from scale, scope and network e®ects, is paralyzed by several obstacles to consolida-
tion. Besides political, cultural and legal barriers among the di®erent countries, the motives of the market
participants such as infrastructure providers and direct users sometimes contribute to the impediment of
consolidation e®orts and thus prevent a socially optimal solution.
What has become increasingly visible is the lack of a common communication standard among service
providers. This could be a result of vertically integrated providers with incompatible information dissem-
ination standards and post-trading routines. As a consequence, the typical cross-border trade requires
substantial interaction among the pertaining di®erent trading, clearing and settlement systems which
can only be e®ectively dealt with by additional intermediaries such as (sub)custodians. This extends the
length of the value chain and thereby increases the costs for the investors. More interaction requirement
is also more risky due to the higher complexity of the trade and a higher likelihood of failures. Higher
risks usually mean additional collateral requirements which is a further cost driver.
Not surprisingly, there are diverging opinions on how to cope with the current ine±ciencies. Don
Cruickshank, former CEO of the London Stock Exchange, favors a market structure that separates
trading from post-trading activities while the latter should be organized as an utility comparable to the
DTCC in the US:
"If the single market in ¯nancial services is to be delivered, then competition and regulatory
policies must be allowed to work side by side. [...] We can see [that] some spring shoots of
such an approach is in moves to allow exchanges to compete on a harmonised utility clearing
1Lannoo and Levin (2001, p. 14 - 30) and Deutsche BÄ orse Group and Clearstream International (2002, p. 15 - 29) present
a cost analysis of cross-border transactions.
1and settlement layer as the most e®ective way of reducing transaction costs in the securities
industry as a whole, and maximising the potential for competition elsewhere in the securities
value chain."2
This stands in stark contrast to Werner Seifert's view, CEO of Deutsche BÄ orse, who claims that an
e±cient solution can be delivered by vertical integration of the activities and that the culprit are the
myriads of di®erent regulators in the EU:
"Many people claim that clearing and settlement should be done by a single, Europe-wide
utility, like in the US, and that greedy private operators help themselves from the till by
insisting that trading, clearing and settlement remain integrated. Not so! At Deutsche BÄ orse
we have looked at this very closely, and the overwhelming problem in the integration of
European capital markets is driven by di®erent regulations, even di®erent applications of
identical rules where they exist, - the whole messy business of EU regulation, with actual
implementation left to the member states."3
What these two views reveal is that di®erent and sometimes intertwined forces are at play in the
European securities transaction industry. The motives of the di®erent opponents can be biased by
strategic deliberations and the desire to advance the industry structure to the own advantage. This
paper sheds some light on these opposing claims by applying economic tools to identify the underlying
economies in the industry and to comment on an e±cient securities transaction system for the European
Union. Our contribution is to provide a framework for the analysis of this industry which identi¯es
and structures the di®erent elements, interprets e±ciency in a broader sense and o®ers policy advice by
proposing consistently con¯gured trading, clearing and settlement systems (TCS-Systems) that achieve
high levels of e±ciency from the perspective of a benevolent system designer. Applying the methodology
of systems theory, we give answers to the following questions: (1)What are economic characteristics
of the relevant activities and which institutions are involved in these activities? (2) Which strategic
decisions can be conducted by the industry players and what are the consequences thereof? (3) What
are consistently con¯gured systems that provide superior e±ciency to alternative set-ups?
Our framework presents three systems for the European securities transaction industry that are con-
¯gured in a consistent way: The ¯rst assigns a prominent role towards regulation and allows to capture
the economies in the industry to a great extent by integrating and consolidating the di®erent activities in
the di®erent national markets. The second lets the market forces work and - although more fragmented -
2Cruickshank (2003).
3Seifert (2003, p. 82).
2allows for high innovation and dynamics in the industry. The third consistent system is characterized by
consolidation and integration as well, but instead of heavy regulation it is kept open to market forces by
adjusting the necessary elements so that any ensuing monopoly remains contestable. We conclude that
the third system has its advantages over the other two and policy makers in the European Union should
strive to implement the various elements of it to a coherent whole to the bene¯t of the European capital
market.
Related literature Public authorities and academics alike have taken an interest into the European
securities transaction industry. Di®erent regulatory bodies and committees established by the European
Commission mainly focus on the identi¯cation of structural weaknesses of the industry and outline con-
crete recommendations to overcome these problems: In response to ECOFIN's request to give regulatory
proposals for the European Securities Markets in 2001, the Committee of Wise Men, chaired by Alexandre
Lamfalussy, demands a further restructuring and a scrutiny for the requirement of a regulatory framework
in the clearing and settlement area. Furthermore, they point at competitive issues and general systemic
risk aspects that may evolve in the context of monetary policy and the functioning of payment systems.4
The Giovannini Group, a consultative group headed by Alberto Giovannini and appointed by the Euro-
pean Commission, analyzes the cross-border clearing and settlement arrangements in the EU and ¯nds
that international transactions are more complex and costly than domestic transactions due to ¯fteen
barriers and that these ine±ciencies represent a paramount barrier to integrated ¯nancial markets.5
The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) disagrees to the claim of some
market participants that a forced consolidation into a pan-European regulated utility would solve these
problems. Instead they pledge for an ownership separation between trading and post-trading facilities
in order to foster fair competition.6 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and
the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) jointly
developed recommendations for securities settlement systems that aim to improve the safety and e±ciency
of these systems. In particular the report recommends minimum requirements that these systems should
be obliged to ful¯ll and the best practices that they should strive for.7 Based on these recommendations,
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the ECB published 19 standards8, which
also incorporated comments on standardization, communication and messaging and business continuity9
4See Lamfalussy (2001).
5See Giovannini Group (2001) and Giovannini Group (2003) for details on these barriers in di®erent areas.
6See European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2001).
7See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions (2001).
8See Committee of European Securities Regulators and European Central Bank (2003).
9These issues were particularly raised by the G30, an international body composed of senior ¯gures from the private and
3as well as on standards for risk management controls10.
Academic papers usually highlight particular aspects of the industry by focussing on a certain aspect
in the securities transaction value chain while inevitably neglecting other potentially interrelated factors.
Some contributions provide empirical research on the main activities: MalkamÄ aki and Iftekhar (2000)
investigate on potential economies of scale and scope at stock exchanges while Schmiedel, MalkamÄ aki,
and Tarkka (2002) focus on the same subject in the case of settlement systems. A related study was
conducted on network e®ects at exchanges by Schmiedel and Iftekhar (2003). Additionally, formal models
are presented for various topics such as on the economics of ¯nancial networks by Economides (1993), on
vertical integration by KÄ oppl and Monnet (2003) and Tapking and Yang (2004), on competition between
central securities depositories (CSD) by Kauko (2003) and on competition between custodians and CSDs
by Holthausen and Tapking (2003). Furthermore, moral hazard aspects were modelled to distinguish
between net and gross settlement by Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003).
There are however also contributions that apply a more holistic approach and thus are closer related to
the framework developed in our paper. One of the ¯rst academic contributions is by Giddy, Saunders, and
Walter (1996): They analyze four alternative models for the European clearing and settlement market
mainly from the perspective of the users of these services. Di®erences between their models exist in
the way that linkages between the CSDs are structured. Our approach is similar to theirs in respect
to evaluating trading, clearing and settlement along three dimensions and deriving distinct systems for
a future industry setting. Unlike their approach, we take microeconomic incentives of the key industry
players in more detail into account and base the analysis of possible systems on sounder foundations
regarding these aspects.
The paper by Milne (2002) establishes analogies between utility network industries such as the telecom-
munication sector and the securities settlement market. These markets, he argues, have similarities in
possessing a natural monopoly that has to be regulated. Milne identi¯es the book-entry function and
the transmission of corporate actions as the two functions of the value chain that need to be regulated
via access pricing and the establishment of common communication standards. He concludes that this
minimal regulatory e®ort should su±ce to create a level playing ¯eld on all other stages such as clear-
ing, settlement and custody, rendering further public interventions unnecessary. While we agree on this
notion, we extent his policy advice by presenting and applying a more comprehensive framework that -
together with the methodology of system theory - allows a broader policy advice.
public sectors and academia.
10The European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (EACH) was one of the initiators of this point.
4Structure of the paper Section 2 brie°y describes the three e±ciency concepts deployed in this
paper. We concentrate on the activities of trading, clearing and settlement along the value chain and the
providing institutions.11 We explain the underlying economies of the activities at each level of the value
chain and the interdependencies across the whole chain in section 3. The important class of regulatory
institutions is brie°y discussed as well. Section 4 regards possible strategies and associated actions to
highlight the microeconomic incentives of the infrastructure providers. Three di®erent decisions have
to be made - where to set the boundaries, whether to adopt an industry-wide standard and how to
assign ownership rights. We show possibly consistent TCS-systems in section 5 that are e±cient from
the viewpoint of social welfare. Its individual components are complementary and thus reinforcing each
other. Potential drawbacks and implications for social welfare are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 Three concepts for evaluation
Economic rents are created through 'good' investment decisions by the various constituencies and allo-
cated to these institutions through 'good' distribution rules. This interplay between ex ante incentives
and ex post distribution determines the e±ciency of possible TCS-systems. We analyze e±ciency along
the three lines of static, dynamic and systemic e±ciency to (1) evaluate the generated economic rents
and (2) estimate the resulting overall e±ciency. We shortly describe each concept and potential trade-o®s
between them.
Static e±ciency A certain activity is performed in a statically e±cient way if there is no solution
that would allow a less costly implementation. It is under this notion that the commonly used concept
of cost e±ciency is considered. Parameters in°uencing the static e±ciency are the costs of production
which in turn are in°uenced by the underlying technologies and the economies arising from these. In the
securities transaction industry, network externalities12 are prevalent. They lead in many areas, like the
trading of a single derivative instrument or the settlement of a particular stock, to an e±cient market
structure that is a natural monopoly.
Static e±ciency thus generally increases if the number of companies conducting business along the
securities transaction value chain decreases due to the underlying economies. The costs of any regulation
11Custody functions follow the settlement process. These ensue the distribution of coupon payments, the implementation
of corporate actions and the lending of securities besides the trading-induced transfer of ownership. We will subsume these
transaction-induced custody aspects under the settlement activity and ignore the other services in custody. Taking into
account all aspects of custody would add to the complexity, while providing only limited value-added for our purposes.
12For a detailed discussion on network externalities confer Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 173 - 225).
5that has to be set up to keep the remaining companies and their rent-extracting potential in check,
however, lead to a lowering of static e±ciency.
Dynamic e±ciency Activities are performed in a dynamically e±cient way if today's structures and
investments do not hamper the performance of these activities in the future. By investing in a certain
technology or by institutionalizing a certain industry structure, the ability to change and to adapt becomes
a®ected. Particularly the dominance by a network provider or the sponsor of a network - as Economides
calls it - may have detrimental e®ects on the innovativeness of the market.13 Industry structures and
processes that do not allow for innovation and for quality improvement in future thus are not e±cient
under the notion of dynamic e±ciency. Competition in the market usually helps to alleviate problems
such as low innovativeness, poor quality of the goods and services whereas the absence of competition may
lead to complacency and to less innovation as it is common in a monopolistic environment. For estimating
dynamic e±ciency key parameters are (1) the industry structure that determines the di±culty of entering
the TCS-industry, (2) the rate of technological innovation and (3) the propensity of all institutions to
invest and the resulting sum of all investments.
Systemic e±ciency Our third evaluation concept, denoted systemic e±ciency, provides insight on
systemic risk issues that are inherent on various stages of the value chain and takes into account the
stability of the TCS-industry when faced with adverse systemic events. We de¯ne systemic e±ciency as
the degree of robustness of the activities in the securities transaction industry to systemic risks that are
borne from strong adverse systemic events.14 A systemic event occurs when a 'bad event' for one or more
market participant(s) has subsequent negative repercussions on other market participants. Such an event
may vary in severity, ranging from a delay in payment or delivery of the securities in question to a full-
blown failure of a party to meet the agreed-upon obligations. Potential contagion e®ects have to be taken
seriously most notably in cases of strong negative systemic events like a failure of an institution. Systemic
risk issues are treated with great care by public and private entities. Both ex ante (crisis prevention) and
ex post (crisis management) measures have to be introduced in order to deal with systemic risks. 'Good'
regulation has to ensure this.
Interdependencies Note that the three concepts of e±ciency are interdependent: (1) The statically
e±cient solution of a monopoly conveys only minor incentives to innovate whereas a few players in an
13See Economides (1993, p. 92).
14The terminology used is adapted from de Bandt and Hartmann (2000) albeit the authors discuss this issue in much
greater depth. See de Bandt and Hartmann (2000, p. 10 - 17) for further details.
6oligopoly can interact in heavy competition and try to develop better products and processes thereby
increasing dynamic e±ciency. They also compete for monopoly rents, that are non-existent in a perfect-
competition-environment where the users of the infrastructure reap the main part of economic rents. The
potential pro¯t that can be gained is therefore a big enough incentive to undertake the large technolog-
ical investments needed up-front. (2) Static e±ciency can decline when measures are taken to increase
systemic e±ciency: The provision of collateral e.g. increases the stability of the industry against adverse
shocks but levies opportunity costs on the market participants. The existence of economic rents also
facilitates the build-up of a ¯nancial bu®er that allows these companies to be more stable in times of
systemic crises. (3) Perfect competition would contribute potentially more in terms of innovativeness
thereby increasing dynamic e±ciency but the systemic e±ciency could be damaged since a more frag-
mented structure may impose more work on regulators to keep the overall system sound. However,
competition also fosters innovations in risk management tools which are bene¯cial to systemic e±ciency.
3 The securities transaction industry
To analyze the securities transaction industry we de¯ne the securities transaction value chain and the
institutions that are involved in these activities. The value chain has three main activities: Securities
need to be traded, the results of the trade have to be con¯rmed and calculated by a clearing process and
the delivery of money and paper to the parties to a trade has to be settled by institutions that provide
this infrastructure, e.g. exchanges, clearing houses and central securities depositories (CSD). Two other
classes of institutions are involved in the value chain, namely the users and regulators. The users are the
clients of the infrastructure provider and can be further broken down into banks and brokers as direct
users15 and investors and issuers as indirect users. The regulators monitor the processes in the industry
to ensure a sound and e±cient transaction environment. Their appropriate role is discussed at the end
of this section.
3.1 Economies of the securities transaction value chain
Network e®ects There exist strong positive network externalities on each of the three stages: In
trading, network e®ects can be both observed on the investors' as well as on the issuers' side. For the
15Banks and brokers are the main institutions using the infrastructure as the immediate users. They play a pivotal role
in the securities transaction value chain for institutional as well as retail investors on the one side and for companies with
their underwriting business on the other side. By internalizing security transactions and by acting as subcustodians, banks
are to a certain degree also direct competitors of the infrastructure providers. A model on the competitive relationship
between CSDs and custodians can be found in Holthausen and Tapking (2003).
7former, becoming a member of an already large network of investors that trade on the same platform
increases both her own and the other's utility by providing additional liquidity to the market.16 The
latter group bene¯ts from larger networks as these can absorb the issuers' need for capital more easily.
There are viable positive network externalities on the user side for both clearing and settlement.
A concentration on few transaction systems allows for a higher portion of clearing and settlement in-
structions to be processed internally. This increases the utility of all users because costly links to other
networks become less necessary. In the extreme, a single clearing and settlement network would be
faster and less costly in comparison to processes which require the interaction with several clearing and
settlement systems.
Economies of scale The providers of trading, clearing and settlement facilities can reap signi¯cant
economies of scale as the setup costs for a transaction platform have a substantial portion of ¯xed
costs so that average costs fall with increasing transaction volume. This view is con¯rmed by empirical
investigations. MalkamÄ aki's analysis on the processing of trades at stock exchanges shows scale economies
for increasing trading volume.17 Another contribution by Schmiedel, MalkamÄ aki, and Tarkka (2002)
measured signi¯cant economies of scale for settlement systems: Platforms with high transaction volumes
will be able to o®er lower transaction costs to users than low-volume competitors. For non-automated
transaction systems, i.e. °oor-based trading, this e®ect is not as pronounced as for automated trading
systems since the ratio of ¯xed costs to variable costs is higher for the computerized system.
Economies of scale are also present in counterparty risk management. Especially if a central couter-
party (CCP) is used in the clearing stage, the users of the facility can save resources on the management
and control of counterparty risks. By pooling risk management facilities at the CCP, costs can be
eliminated by risk management specialization e®ects. Additionally, if netting mechanisms are used, the
users will enjoy reduced capital provision requirements and therefore lower opportunity costs.18 As a
consequence, scale economies may be even more pronounced in clearing than in other stages.
Economies of scope All three activities exhibit potential economies of scope. Providers are able to
process di®erent types of securities on the same platform while incurring only relatively low incremental
costs. Clearing facilities that process di®erent classes of securities such as stocks, bonds, and derivatives
16The pivotal role of liquidity stems from the potentially large costs that can arise from illiquidity during trading.
According to Deutsche BÄ orse Group and Clearstream International (2002, p. 17 - 22) their proportion of total trading
costs is substantial. Liquidity can be characterized along four dimensions, namely width, depth, immediacy and resilience.
See Harris (1991, p. 3). For an excellent model of such two-sided markets see Rochet and Tirole (2003).
17However, he con¯nes his ¯ndings for very large stock exchanges. See MalkamÄ aki (1999) for further details.
18See Van Cauwenberge (2003, p. 94).
8have additional leeway for scope economies as they are able to implement innovative risk management
procedures such as cross-collateralizing along di®erent securities classes. This would lead to an overall
decrease in capital provision requirements to the users and would consequently save costs.
The upshot of the results above suggests a tendency towards a strong concentration of the activities or
even a natural monopoly on each stage of the value chain due to the underlying and mutually reinforcing
economies. According to our de¯nition in section 2 a concentration in the industry translates into high
static e±ciency.
Contestability of the market A concentrated market in turn lowers dynamic e±ciency as the latter
falls with decreasing levels of competition. The existence of substantial network externalities, scale
and scope economies create a barrier to entry and o®er established platforms some protection from
competitors.19 Nevertheless, high levels of dynamic e±ciency can be achieved if the market for securities
transactions remains contestable, i.e. if competitive and innovative infrastructure providers can gain
market share at the expense of established competitors.
The diversion of transaction volume is the more likely the more of the following aspects coincide:
(1) The competitor demands lower fees.Domowitz and Steil (1999, p. 8 - 9) give several examples of
this behavior. (2) A competing provider o®ers a signi¯cantly better service for users based on a better
technology which manifests itself in faster, more reliable or more convenient transaction handling. (3)
The competitor o®ers new products or services which have not been supplied and therefore 'monopolized'
by an established provider yet. (4) Clearing and settlement institutions reduce their capital provision
requirements by introducing netting processes. However, this point may be a matter of regulatory concern
as competing institutions might want to apply less stringent risk management to successfully underbid
the fee structure of competitors.
Systemic risk issues Systemic e±ciency is particularly relevant in the clearing and settlement of
securities and appendant funds. There are several sources of and alleviation e®orts to systemic risks.
Clearing and settlement institutions have developed risk management tools that attempt to reduce both
ex ante and ex post the various types of settlement risk. Since the various types of systemic risks such as
counterparty, custody and cross-border risks have been elaborated in detail by other contributors20 we
focus on the relationship between systemic e±ciency and market concentration. The relationship is not
19This view is shared by Economides (1993, p. 92 - 93). He states that as a consequence of the reinforcing nature, a
¯nancial "network exhibits positive critical mass". A further consequence of networks "is that history matters [...] because
of signi¯cant switching costs" which protect established players in the market.
20See Giovannini Group (2001, p. 18 - 19) and de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
9straight-forward. Both a fragmented and a consolidated industry structure have to deal with trade-o®s.
A concentrated industry structure can exploit economies in centralizing risk management e®orts as it
is more cost e±cient to have one party collect the information and to monitor the other parties instead
of having all parties monitoring each other. Thus, a central risk manager will be more cost e±cient and
more sophisticated. However, the central risk manager may bank too strongly on its dominant position
and believe that public entities would bail him out in case of a failure. Moral hazard may materialize
in the form of reduced monitoring e®orts.21 Therefore regulatory e®ort - albeit rather easy as only one
institution has to be controlled - might be necessary.22 Additionally, a higher degree of consolidation
leads to less complexity in the interaction between the providers and thus reduces the probability of
failures in communication and asset transfers.
A fragmented industry structure on the other hand may provide systemic e±ciency that is superior
to a concentrated market. More industry players will usually lead to higher levels of competition. A
possible parameter of competition can be the provision of sound and stable transaction systems among
providers which boosts systemic e±ciency. Another positive aspect of fragmentation is the existence of
redundancies which - if communication protocols between di®erent transaction systems are compatible -
can be used to re-route transactions from a failed to an intact system. Multiple transaction systems may
thus increase the robustness of the industry although potential contagion e®ects between the providers
may weaken this advantage.
3.2 Vertical interdependencies in the securities transaction value chain
In several European countries, the dominant trading institution often also exercises control in the activities
further downstream, i.e. the exchange is vertically integrated into the domestic clearing and settlement
activities. This setting is mainly driven by e±ciency motives as it enables to process straight-through the
whole transaction in a faster, more cost e±cient and more reliable manner. Straight-through-processing
(STP) at a single institution o®ers signi¯cant economies to both users and providers in comparison to
the processing between separate entities as: (1) It lowers communication costs between the respective
activities thereby improving static e±ciency. (2) Innovations concerning the processing of transactions
are easier to implement since coordination e®orts with other providers along the value chain are not
necessary. This shortens the implementation period and therefore increases dynamic e±ciency. (3) It
makes transaction failures less frequent since the data transmission process is optimized in-house, for
example by implementing a proprietary communication standard. This represents an improvement in
21See Diamond (1984) on the use of such delegated monitoring as a rationale for the existence of banks.
22Confer de Bandt and Hartmann (2000, p. 17) for further details.
10systemic e±ciency.
However, with the decline in IT-infrastructure costs in recent years, the arguments for vertical inte-
gration are not as strong as they have been some years ago as transmission costs to outside institutions
are now signi¯cantly less costly and not necessarily higher than in-house transmission costs.
Furthermore, as trading habits of investors gradually shift from a domestic towards a more interna-
tional approach, the national 'silos', as the vertically integrated entities are also called, not only no longer
represent the investor's scope of transaction activities but even hamper frictionless processing of cross-
border transactions in Europe. This is due to their incompatible proprietary communication standards
which each national silo had developed to communicate along its own controlled value chain - a legacy
that makes communication between silos a highly complex and ine±cient task.
Di®ering communication standards between vertical silos also de facto impede the contestability of
the downstream activities, i.e. clearing and settlement markets. They represent an e®ective entry-barrier
against other providers that strive to enter the market of an established silo. They are unable to do
so because once a trade is made on the established trading platform, competitors are restricted to o®er
their services for the downstream functions due to the existing proprietary communication standard
of the established provider. Therefore, clearing and settlement activities of the established provider are
protected by its trading activity and are thus barely subject to contestability. This may result in dynamic
ine±ciencies.
3.3 Regulation
E±cient trading, clearing and settlement of securities is important for the functioning of the whole
economy. Companies need to get access to ¯nance and private households need a vehicle by which
they can save their ¯nancial surplus. This assigns ¯nancial markets in general and the TCS-industry in
particular a pivotal role. The well-being of other industries and many people depends on it. Adverse
e®ects spill over into other parts of the economy implying negative externalities. Therefore, regulation of
the TCS-industry is a means to avoid or to mitigate these external e®ects.
These spill-over e®ects are very material in the settlement stage of the securities transaction value
chain when the payment system is involved. A failure of one party to meet its obligations might lead
to contagion e®ects that have negative e®ects on the liquidity of the banking system and threatening
the economy by this transmission channel. The central bank as lender of last resort therefore has an
incentive to deal with these regulatory issues. It therefore needs to be - and also is - one of the key
regulating institutions since central bank money is frequently involved in settling the cash side of securities
11transactions. Other regulatory bodies are concerned with di®erent aspects: For example, the performance
of each activity for all users - which are of a considerably heterogeneous degree - in a fair manner needs to
be ensured, i.e. access to the infrastructure must be open and in an undiscriminating way. The European
Commission with various reports - the Lamfalussy Report, the two reports of the Giovannini Group and
the Investment Services Directive for example - is committed to this task in the Single European Market.
National agencies implement actions to put these aspects into practice today. Regulators often join their
forces to set standards after consulting the relevant industry players, e.g. the joint working group set up
by the ECB and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). A single European Financial
Services Authority might one day take over this job. In all cases, the right balance between static,
dynamic and systemic e±ciency must be chosen by regulators.
Regulation lowers static e±ciency since it is costly to set up a bureaucracy - or a publicly owned entity
in the extreme - to achieve the performance of the three activities in the value chain. The 'outsourcing'
of regulation to the providers and to the users of the infrastructure could be a cost-e±cient alternative.
Possible means for this outsourcing lie in the self-regulation by the infrastructure provider. Whenever
they can compete on quality as many exchanges do with di®erent market segments and the attached
regulatory conditions, regulation need not be of the costly public variant. As a second means, the
infrastructure can also be user-governed. In this setting, the club of users writes its own rules. Whenever
little entry in this club is required, this can again be better than publicly provided regulation.
The current system with competing regulatory regimes in Europe - with sometimes overlapping com-
petencies, sometimes unattended areas - is seen nearly unanimously by the industry as a major barrier
to business since a level playing ¯eld is not provided. We come back to the question of regulation in the
context of the three e±cient systems in section 5.
4 Strategic conduct - The provider's action set
In this section we analyze the three key parameters in our framework that the providers of the infrastruc-
ture, the users and the regulating institutions can use to interact strategically to shape the future of
the securities transaction industry. The focus is on the providers of the infrastructure, possible actions
and reactions of the other two classes of institutions are taken into account where necessary. The three
parameters in the action set that we look at are (1) the boundary decision of the infrastructure providers,
(2) the decision whether to adopt an open standard or to develop a proprietary communication tool and
(3) the governance of the infrastructure providers.
124.1 Boundary decision
The institutions providing the infrastructure for trading, clearing and settling the di®erent ¯nancial
instruments face the problem whether to integrate di®erent activities under the institutional roof of one
¯rm or whether to concentrate on just one function or one speci¯c ¯nancial instrument. We describe two
distinct business models - the vertically integrated silo and the vertically focused ¯rm.
The vertically integrated silo The ¯rst business model is the vertical silo - the combination of
trading, clearing and settlement under the roof of one ¯rm. It is applied for example by Deutsche BÄ orse
AG. The advantage of such a model is that it allows to reap the bene¯ts that derive from the economies
of scope between the three functions as described in section 3.2. Communication is easier when the three
functions are performed in close proximity within the same organization. Speci¯c forms of data exchanges
between the three stages of the value chain and straight-through processing allow for the emergence of
economic rents.23
However, one of the adverse e®ects such a business model has, which might be a prevalent microeco-
nomic motive behind this strategy, is the leverage of a (natural) monopoly on one stage of the value chain
upstream or downstream to other stages. Particularly, a vertical silo may cross-subsidize its trading costs
- and thereby attracting customers from other platforms - through its monopoly pro¯ts on the clearing
and settlement stage or vice versa.24 By this strategy, an institution following the business model of
vertical integration e®ectively strengthens its competitive position. Furthermore, the vertical silo fore-
closes the market for competitors: By restricting access for them in one activity, users can be forced also
to 'buy' the solution for another activity from the same institution. If there is no choice for them but
to deal with the same provider, a monopoly rent can be extracted from the users further increasing the
economic rents generated in this model due to the speci¯city inherent in it.
Therefore, the interesting question arises whether Deutsche BÄ orse can deliver its promises given that it
controls downstream activities and de facto can foreclose the market due to its monopoly on the following
stage in the value chain. When faced with the speci¯c and co-specialized investments have to undertake,
banks and brokers could be reluctant to join in this venture.
The vertically focused ¯rm The other business model that has promising features is that of more
focused infrastructure providers and the use of market mechanisms between them. A prominent example
23See Williamson (1985) for the role of speci¯city in explaining vertical integration.
24The detrimental e®ect of vertical integration on horizontal consolidation between di®erent infrastructure providers on
the same stage of the securities transaction value chain is formalized by KÄ oppl and Monnet (2003) in a mechanism design
model taking into account the asymmetry of information between the di®erent players.
13for this industry setting was used in England, where three independent institutions, namely London
Stock Exchange, London Clearing House and Crest, provided infrastructure services only for one stage
of the value chain, respectively.25 If a good solution for the data transfer between the three activities
of the securities transaction value chain is implemented, this model has appeal because it does not
give too much power into the hands of a single entity that can control access to its infrastructure -
an infrastructure that exhibits strong network e®ects. For each activity, the users can choose the best
institution that provides it in the most e±cient way. Competition forces less e±cient institutions out of
business and sets high-powered incentives for the surviving. As such ¯rms do not have to worry about
any interdependencies between their di®erent lines of business, they are more eager to adopt new and
better technologies and processes. Any cannibalization of value propositions within the same ¯rm cannot
happen. These institutions increase therefore static and dynamic e±ciency. A possible drawback which
might be taken into account by the regulators is less systemic stability that too high-powered incentives
might induce. How the problem of establishing a market mechanism for the intermediate goods - the
information transfer from one stage to the next in the value chain - can be dealt with is the topic of the
next section.
4.2 Communication standards and accessibility
The interaction between the stages of the value chain is of crucial importance to the way business is
performed in the TCS-industry. It necessitates the infrastructure providers to make decisions both on
the information transfer mode, i.e. the type of communication standard, and the degree of accessibility
of their activities to competitors.
Proprietary versus open communication standards Proprietary standards infer that the infor-
mation format of the transactions cannot be interpreted without co-specialized investments so that com-
petitors are discriminated whereas an open standard enables competitors to process the information and
allows users to switch the providers more easily.26
The decision whether to adopt an open standard or to set up a proprietary system is intertwined with
the vertical boundary decision. In the case of a vertically focused infrastructure provider, the case is
trivial. Such an institution has to rely on the market for the performance of upstream and downstream
25The London Clearing House has recently teamed up with Euronext's Clearnet, whereas Crest has merged with Euroclear
in 2002.
26The battle for an unique communication standard and the di®erent competing approaches are described in Weitzel,
Martin, and KÄ onig (2003).
14activities, the communication protocol has to be in an open and understandable format.27 The case is
di®erent for companies following the business model of a vertical silo: Such companies can develop a
solution that allows them to keep the information that has to be passed along the securities transaction
value chain private. By doing so, it can develop an idiosyncratic data exchange format that allows them
to generate an economic rent due to the speci¯c nature.
However, an economic rent could also be generated by foreclosing the market for an upstream or
downstream activity. Users are forced to rely on the same institution and buy the bundled product in
a one-stop shop. They have to invest in co-specialized computer systems that allow them to handle this
proprietary data format. With an open communication standard between the di®erent stages of the value
chain a deconstruction becomes possible. There would be a choice for customers to deal with the best
and most e±cient institution.
Analyzing open and proprietary communication standards on the basis of our three e±ciency concepts
there are two major advantages for proprietary in comparison to open communication standards: (1)
They can be more speci¯c in relation to a certain ¯nancial instrument or a certain institution than
open communication standards and thus be more statically e±cient. (2) A higher dynamic e±ciency
can be reached since a proprietary communication standard allows for the complete appropriation of the
economic rent that is generated by innovations. Additionally, the bene¯ts of innovations made with open
standards could be enjoyed by every participant without being obliged to invest into this innovation.
Thus, underinvestment problems may arise with open standards.
However, proprietary communication has also two major drawbacks when compared to open standards:
(1) Proprietary standards provide more incentives for strategic behavior to infrastructure providers which
can be to the detriment of the users. Thus, market foreclosure strategies and mutual reinforcements of
monopolies on di®erent stages of the value chain can have a negative impact on users. Both static and
dynamic e±ciency may be impeded. A communication standard that is open to all market participants
prevents or at least alleviates this strategic behavior: It is easier for competitors of the infrastructure
provider or for the users themselves by means of internalization to work around such a foreclosure. (2)
Proprietary standards raise more regulatory concerns if a regulator wants to ensure the proper functioning
of the market and access for other institutions. Therefore, static e±ciency may be lowered due to the
increased regulation costs. Additionally, systemic e±ciency may be low if regulators do not control the
proprietary standard properly.
27One could also imagine the case that a proprietary standard is used. In this case, the outcome would be a hybrid
solution along the lines of Williamson (1985): Long-term contracts or strategic alliances are necessary to account for the
hold-up problem since speci¯c investments have to be made.
15Restricted versus open accessibility Accessibility is the °ip-side of communications and refers to
interactions between competitors across di®erent stages of the value chain, i.e. between trading and
clearing or between clearing and settlement. Open access describes the ability of institutions to provide
their services on one stage of a transaction although other stages of the value chain may be performed by
competitors. This stands in contrast to transactions where access is restricted by a provider. Restriction
of access is possible whenever a provider is able to leverage its dominant position on other stages of the
value chain. This may for example occur when a dominant trading facility prevents other providers of
downstream activities to receive the transaction and automatically route it to their own clearing facility
instead. Another example for dominance can be found in the opposite direction, when a settlement
provider has the monopoly on a certain security and refuses to accept transactions that are traded or
cleared from anybody but its own upstream activity provider. Therefore restricted accessibility can
strongly impede fair competition among providers in the TCS-industry.28
Accessibility as well as the communication standard decision primarily depend on the industry struc-
ture29, the allocation of power between the three classes of institutions, and the governance and ownership
of the providers of the infrastructure. Using (or being forced by a regulatory institution to use) a com-
mon means of communication technology e®ectively opens markets. The power that is conveyed by open
markets to users allows them to search for the best price and quality. This in turn eventually forces a
redistribution of economic rents away from the incumbent providers who would otherwise hang on to an
ine±cient allocation of resources from a welfare perspective. It is to these governance aspects that we
turn next.
4.3 Ownership structure and governance
Ownership of a good is an incentive device: When residual decision rights are aligned with the rights
to residual income, decisions are made in such a way as to maximize this share. The maximization of
it optimizes social welfare whenever these decisions can be made independent of others. It therefore
matters who ultimately has control over a certain good or resource. This is also the case for a ¯rm - a
much more complex 'good' and a whole bundle of resources. For our analysis, we take into account the
ownership structure of a provider of the infrastructure in the securities transaction value chain to check
28See also Milne (2002) who proposes to regulate access to the book transfer (which would fall under the notion of
settlement in our paper) as he identi¯es it as the natural monopoly within the clearing and settlement industry.
29There is a strong interdependency and complementarity between accessibility, communication standard and vertical
boundary decision of the providers: We observe the tendency that a vertically integrated ¯rm often employs a proprietary
standard with restricted access while a vertically focused ¯rm prefers open standards and open accessibility.
16whether economically sound decisions will be made by this institution. Three distinct forms of ownership
can be identi¯ed: (1) A for-pro¯t ¯rm that operates to maximize the pro¯t that is distributable to its
shareholders as dividends, (2) a non-pro¯t mutual that operates to maximize the utility of its members
and (3) a publicly-owned entity that provides a good or service that would not be provided e±ciently by
a private ¯rm due to its public good nature and the underlying external e®ects.
Public ownership of an infrastructure provider can be a means to deliver a service that must be
provided by a natural monopolist. The public policymaker - acting in the interest of society as a whole -
is not interested in narrow pro¯t motives but rather tries to provide this service in the e±cient quantity.
This gain is however very likely to be o®set by ine±ciencies that public bodies bring with them. Without
a pro¯t motive the resulting incentives in the publicly owned '¯rm' are weakened and ine±ciencies are
re-introduced.
In recent years, many publicly-owned monopolies in diverse industries were therefore privatized and
for-pro¯t ¯rms were established instead. In this form of ownership - the standard capitalist form most
commonly analyzed in economic theory - the residual decision rights are aligned with the residual claims
and better incentives are thereby conveyed. The public interest of the provision of the right quantity for
the correct price in these network industries is better served by a regulator that has less decision power
(and less potential for meddling) than an outright publicly owned enterprise. The shift in control and
power away from a public authority towards the private agents that use and provide the infrastructure
increases overall welfare by nurturing better decisions because the resulting economic rents are exploitable
by these decision makers.
The third possible ownership arrangement is that of mutual ownership. In the mutual form, the users
of the infrastructure provide the necessary investments themselves so that the statically e±cient quantity
is produced for a price that is lower than the monopoly price. The direct users are members in the
providing institution and take into account the supplementing function that the infrastructure has for
their core business in which they ultimately want to generate economic rents. The amount of economic
rent that is generated in such a mutually-owned institution is therefore lower compared to a for-pro¯t
¯rm while ine±ciencies are reduced in comparison to a publicly-owned and over-regulated authority.
Such a structure has its drawbacks however. The membership of the mutual can procrastinate and new
entrants can be discouraged from using the same infrastructure. If the members are too heterogeneous,
the governance of 'one member - one vote' instead of 'one share - one vote' can cause decisions to be
distorted by the divergent interests and the larger players can be held up by the smaller institutions.30
30Hart and Moore (1996) present a model in which the heterogeneity of users makes a mutual structure less preferable.
17In recent years there has been a wave of demutualizations, especially among exchanges, due to these
problems.31
Why are ownership and governance aspects important? The governance of the infrastructure
providers is of particular importance for the e±ciency with which securities transactions are performed.
The Council of Institutional Investors - representing 130 pension funds holding 3 trillion dollars in assets
in the USA - criticizes that of the three constituencies of the New York Stock Exchange - members
(intermediaries like broker-dealers and specialists), listed companies and investors - only the members
are allowed to vote and to choose the board. This structure has a potential negative e®ect on the
self-regulation of the exchange since that is biased towards the members' interests.32
The governance structure also in°uences the ability of a ¯rm to innovate and to be e±cient in a more
dynamic sense. Too much power in the wrong hands hinders the necessary innovation in the face of
disruptive technologies. The introduction of electronic trading systems for example was heavily fought
by °oor-based brokers that have an important voice in the governance of exchanges. When these are not
only the users of the infrastructure but can also exert power through a mutual ownership arrangement,
they can block such innovations that would make them worse o® but lead to big gains for other users.
4.4 Interdependencies between the parameters and its con¯gurations
The three described action parameters are not independent of each other. We want to highlight some
interdependencies here as a precursor to the analysis of the three systems compared in section 5.4.
Boundary decision and communication standards Open standards are a means to credibly com-
mit an institution performing a certain function in the securities transaction value chain not to pursue
a foreclosure strategy by vertical integration. The leveraging of a natural monopoly on one stage of the
value chain for a certain ¯nancial instrument cannot be used to force customers to use the infrastructure
of the same institution on the previous or next stage in the value chain as well. The choice for customers
and the threat of market entry by upstarts do not allow institutions to use their power to extract more
than their 'fair' share of economic rents generated by the activities of the securities transaction value
chain. This makes a strategy of vertical integration less attractive. On the contrary, in such a setting it
would be necessary for the integrated institution to compete with many focused ¯rms that know their
activity by heart. Any advantage in terms of higher economic rents these focused institutions can gain
31See also Domowitz and Steil (1999, p. 14 - 16) on this issue.
32See Economist (2003, p. 59) for this example.
18can only come from better service which leads them to pursue a strategy that puts a premium on inno-
vation. Even if the vertically integrated ¯rm also pursued aggressive R&D activities, it would be faced
with the dilemma of cannibalizing its own success whenever it came across an innovation on one stage
of the securities transaction value chain that would force it to restructure the relationship between the
integrated stages. The need to meddle with transfer prices weakens incentives for middle managers or
even leads to outright sabotage of the new product or process by the managers of the less innovative
stage.
Ownership structure and communication standard Economic rents can be generated by for-pro¯t
¯rms by suitably using the ideas of industrial organization theory to structure the industry to make it
more di±cult to enter the market. One such tool is a proprietary standard probably in combination with
a strategy of vertical integration. In the other two ownership forms we described - public and mutual
ownership - these incentives to foreclose the market by opting for a proprietary communication standard
are not that prominent since the appropriation possibilities of any rents generated are less good for the
owners of such institutions. In the case of a publicly provided infrastructure of the natural monopoly
functions this institution will settle on its own (proprietary) standard but fair access is usually granted
by the provider of the public good. In the case of a mutual ownership structure the tendency is for an
open communication standard because the users themselves will gain from less diversity between di®erent
providers since they then have to invest only in one system to cope with data from numerous institutions
on the other stages of the securities transaction value chain. However, incentives to develop the common
standard and to take account of better possibilities in data exchange through broadband connections and
better encryption and decompression algorithms are needed. One possibility is the use of open source-like
structures: Franck and Jungwirth (2002) see the advantage of such structures in donations that are made
by interested institutions without a crowding out of valuable investments in the case of an emerging
standard. Cooperatives are then a preferable institutional setting in the case establishing a standard
without the e®ects of competition that would lead to a fragmentation or to a lock-in in an ine±cient
system.33
Boundary decision and ownership structure Mutually owned institutions have their drawbacks
in terms of slow decision making and weakened incentives due to the lack of the pro¯t motive. Vertical
integration augments this disadvantage by making the institution even more complex. The users of
33For a theoretical underpinning of cooperatives and their investment incentives in emerging standards see the work of
Rey and Tirole (2001).
19the infrastructure for the securities transaction value chain are therefore more likely to set up several
cooperatives each one highly focused along the value chain that have probably di®erent members and to
rely on open standards for the exchange of information between them. The users themselves restrict the
activities of a cooperative to the absolute necessary.
The solution of public ownership is more likely to be vertically integrated but a sensible and eco-
nomically minded policy maker would again opt for a deconstruction of the value chain and a private
provision for the activities where this is the best option. Unregulated private institutions run in the best
interest of their shareholders, i.e. without ignoring incentives for managers to engage in empire-building
activities, are very likely to pursue a strategy to shape the industry in their favor and to erect entry bar-
riers whenever possible. As mentioned before, a foreclosure strategy of leveraging a monopoly position
from one activity to the next makes perfect sense for such institutions. Privately owned companies are
therefore likely to increase their scale and scope by actively integrating along the value chain when no
countervailing forces prevail.
We have now outlined the constituents of our framework and discussed them in detail. In the following
section we put these parameters together to concentrate on the systemic relationships between them that
make some combinations better from a socially e±cient viewpoint than others.
5 Three proposals for an e±cient TCS-system
Systems in general consist of various modules. Between these modules or elements there can be a com-
plementary relationship. Complementarity between any two such elements implies that the simultaneous
increase in both elements leads to an overall superior performance. In the case that such a complementary
relation between the elements of a system exists, the right con¯guration of these modules matters. Only
if they are adjusted in a coherent fashion, the system in question will be internally consistent. Such a con-
sistent system will perform better than any system in which deviations from the coherent con¯guration
in one or a few parameters occur.34
This section presents three idealized systems where the con¯gurations of selected elements, especially
the parameters of the action set described above, are set thus that the complementary relationship is
34Mathematically, complementarity relates to a positive cross-derivative: The ¯rst-order returns for the increase in one
element are still more enhanced if the second element is also increased. Consistency is the characteristic that any pairwise
combination between any two elements has a non-negative cross-derivative - also referred to as a supermodular relationship -
between them. See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for an application of system theory in the context of modern manufacturing.
See Topkis (1998) for a mathematical approach.
20taken account for and the overall system is e±cient from the viewpoint of a benevolent system designer.
Small deviations from the con¯gurations suggested lead to an overall less e±cient solution.
5.1 System 1 - Regulated monopoly
Description The system of a regulated monopoly has two distinct features implied by its name: (1)
there is no competition in the provision of the activities on those levels of the securities transaction value
chain that are consolidated and (2) the role of the regulating institutions is very pronounced in these
stages. Usually the roles of regulators and providers are combined and the infrastructure is publicly
owned.
The horizontally consolidated and possibly even vertically integrated structure can take several forms
depending on the scale of integration in each activity. In the USA for example, the Depositories Trust &
Clearing Corporation is the monopoly for clearing and settlement activities and trading occurs on several
exchanges. Many national markets in Europe were structured as a vertical silo with all three activities
integrated into one entity. Where are the advantages of such a system?
The consolidation in each activity allows to reap economies of scale and scope along the securities
transaction value chain for the providers. Users on the other hand enjoy the strong bene¯ts of a single
network. The public ownership and the lack of competition lead to low incentives to innovation activity.
The threat of entry is subdued since the underlying economies as well as the publicly sanctioned role as
the sole provider entrench this institution.
Vertical integration even enhances this entrenchment but leads also to the possibility of straight-
through processing and an e±cient use and dissemination of information from one stage of the value
chain to the next. The low rate of innovation and the resulting stability in the industry makes it feasible
to write detailed plans. The low innovation activity is also consistent with a low investment propensity
of all players and low total investments. The users of the infrastructure are willing to undertake the
necessary co-specialized investments. The standardization process is organized by the regulator which
uses its powerful position to enforce and set the standard means of communication. The sum of total
investments is low since no company can compete with such a vertically integrated, publicly owned
institution that uses the underlying economies of scale and scope.
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency in these settings is relatively high due to the strong exploitation of
network, scale and scope economies. The signi¯cant market power of the providers has its counterweight
in the public ownership structure so that the ine±ciencies of a monopoly do not prevail. However, the
incentive structure within a big public agency brings also some costs in terms of lost e±ciency. It depends
21on the actual processes and organizational structures of this body whether the combined e®ect is still
positive.
Dynamic e±ciency is rather low due to the lack of competition. The pressure for product or service
innovations will remain limited to the detriment of the users. The overall investment activity is too low
and potential competitors are deterred from entering the industry.
The analysis of systemic e±ciency in these settings has a two-sided result. Consolidation enables
the centralization of risk management at the infrastructure providers which can be more e±cient than a
decentralized risk management solution. However, as mentioned above, moral hazard aspects such as the
reduction of risk management e®orts due to a too-big-to-fail-feeling may endanger systemic e±ciency in
these settings.
The regulating institutions are the center of power in the system of a regulated monopoly. Ideally,
this should reduce potential moral hazard issues in risk management, ensure fair transaction prices for
the users, i.e. the users should bene¯t from exploited scale economies. However, regulation itself is costly
so that increasing systemic e±ciency will lead to a loss in dynamic e±ciency. This system is most notably
interesting when static e±ciency aspects outweigh dynamic considerations. This may be the case when
disruptive innovations are expected to be rather rare in the future and the processes in the industry are
settled and stable.
5.2 System 2 - Competitive fragmentation
Description In contrast to system 1 the market structure of system 2 is rather scattered, i.e. it features
polypolistic characteristics including several providers for trading, clearing and settlement. A high level
of competition on all stages of the securities transaction value chain leads to a high rate of technological
innovation. The fragmented industry structure necessitates the use of open standards since otherwise
the users would have to undertake co-specialized investments to several providers. Open standards and
good access possibilities allow for new institutions to enter the market easily whenever they see ¯t. This
is consistent with the high rate of innovation that is increased by such new entrants. The tendency to
invest is high since it can be the basis of Schumpeterian rents. The resulting overall investment level is
therefore possibly too high when too many uncoordinated investments are undertaken. Over-investment
and a resulting bubble can lead to cycles of investments that exacerbate the economic cycle and the ups
and downs of ¯nancial markets.
The ownership of these ¯rms rests in private hands since that is the most e±cient incentive tool to
sustain the needed rate of technological progress to keep this system stable. The role of the regulators
22is very subdued: Any exaggerated activity by them would lead to a lowering of investment incentives
for the private companies that then would have to fear a meddling of the regulators. The only activity
they should engage in is to ensure the open access. Self-regulation by the competing providers is a means
for them to di®erentiate themselves from competitors and attract more users and a better competitive
advantage. The epicenter of power lies with the privately owned providers or with the users depending
on the providers' ownership structure. The tendency for vertically integrating the securities transaction
value chain is low: Cross-subsidies from one stage to the next are not possible due to the ¯erce competition
on each stage and the reluctance for change in such a vertically integrated institution that is faced with
cannibalizing its own success whenever new processes or products occur makes it a suboptimal solution.
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency is low in this setting. The relatively small size of the providers
does not allow for the harvest of scale and scope economies. Also, positive network e®ects for the users
remain unexploited due to the large number of smaller networks in this fragmented industry setup.
Consolidation e®orts exist, but a constant stream of new industry entrants armed with new, innovative
products and services prevent the creation of one dominant monopoly. A system with several relatively
small market participants prevails.
Dynamic e±ciency on the other hand is high due to ¯erce competition and low entry barriers of
the market. Open communication standards ensure that providers with better services will be able to
o®er their service to users without being strongly hampered by established providers. Even users such
as banks can e®ectively threat providers to internalize transactions should they not be satis¯ed with
existing products and services. An exact con¯guration of the elements is necessary to keep this system
stable between two countervailing forces. On the one hand, an industry setting with open standards may
not provide enough incentives for the providers to develop the standardized technology further due to
free-riding inducements. On the other hand, uncoordinated investments can lead to value destruction
when too much is invested in boom times of a cycle. The system has therefore to strike a delicate balance
between this under- and overinvestment problem.
Systemic e±ciency is rather high. Although this setting has no (public) regulator but is mainly
self-regulated, the robustness in the provision of securities transaction possibilities is nevertheless quite
high. The driving factor is the competition among providers, in this case, the competition for the most
stable and secure transaction system. Thus, infrastructure providers have an incentive to compete on
quality and create a safe TCS-environment for their clients. However, an important precondition for this
scenario is the transparency of the providers' risk management e®orts to the users. If it is di±cult for the
latter to evaluate the quality of risk management, the providers may have the adverse incentive to boost
23pro¯tability by cutting down on costly risk management procedures and endanger systemic e±ciency.
This race-to-the-bottom e®ect may be prevented by a user-dominated governance structure.
Another positive aspect of the competitive fragmentation on systemic e±ciency is that the fragmented
market structure which is characterized by high levels of infrastructure redundancies and open standards
enables a relatively easy re-routing of transactions in emergency cases. Ample substitution possibilities
for the users and low switching costs due to open communication standards ensure systemic robustness
in times of the failure of one institution. However, depending on the nature of an adverse systemic
event, contagion between the di®erent transaction systems may occur and thus neutralize the positive
redundancy aspects.
A system of competitive fragmentation is particularly interesting in a dynamically changing environ-
ment when returns on innovations are high and static e±ciency considerations are dominated by dynamic
e±ciency aspects.
5.3 System 3 - Contestable monopolies
Description There are two crucial characteristics to the third system we propose: (1) the market
for infrastructure providers is more or less consolidated and (2) communication between the industry
participants - both horizontally and vertically - is performed via open standards. New entrants into the
market are able to communicate with the others and are granted access to established providers. The
e±cient size with respect to scale and scope economies limits the number of direct competitors on each
horizontal stage and natural monopolies prevail. Also, the users bene¯t from the merits of a large single
network. Vertical integration is rather detrimental in such a system since the monopoly positions on
di®erent stages could be used strategically by the providers to re-enforce rent extraction possibilities in
other activities to the disadvantage of the users. Two possibilities exist by which such behavior can be
ruled out: For one, a public regulator can ensure open access and limit any vertical integration attempts.
For the other, the users themselves can mutually own the necessary infrastructure and restrict such
behavior by the management of the provider in question. Depending on which concept is used to restrict
the infrastructure provider from capturing too large a slice of the economic rents, the epicenter of power
is somewhere between the regulators and the users.
Open standards and guaranteed access allow new entrants to enter the market and thereby limit the
rent appropriation potential of the incumbent further. With better products or processes they are in a
good position to challenge the incumbent and to gain the upper hand eventually. The rate of technological
progress and innovation is therefore higher than in system 1 of a regulated monopoly. The investment
24propensity and also total investment are higher since the incumbent has to keep up with the innovative
progress or risks to become obsolete and to lose his position to an upstart. Again, self-regulation can be
a means of competition with the better quality and stability gaining an advantage. This allows to reduce
the public regulation and the costs associated with it.
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency in a system of contestable monopolies is enhanced in this setting
due to the high level of consolidation in the three stages of the value chain.35 The existence of a quasi-
monopolistic infrastructure enables full exploitation of existing economies of scale and scope and network
e®ects. Static e±ciency gains are passed on to the users in this system as each level on the value chain is
contestable to market entries due to open communication standards. Furthermore, the costs of regulation
can be kept to a minimum and is not distorting investment incentives for the providers.
Dynamic e±ciency is also high and is achieved by the open standards architecture which results in
contestability in each activity and low barriers to entry. This prevents the existing monopolist from
appropriating a too large portion of the monopoly rent as potential entrants with better service o®erings
pose an e®ective threat. Nevertheless, some barriers to entry still exist such as liquidity in a certain
security on the trading level, and allow a monopolist to reap rents from his dominant market position.
These rents further ensure that the incumbent has a strong incentive to maintain this position and react
to the incentives provided thereby. As mentioned in section 4.2, there are also some drawbacks to open
communication standards with regard to dynamic e±ciency aspects such as potential free-riding behavior
in the development of innovations.
Systemic e±ciency is high in this system. The setting bene¯ts from its two main characteristics of
being rather consolidated and having open communication standards. The former aspect enables the
industry to centralize its risk management at one institution while the latter ensures competition for the
most stable transaction system so that the quasi-monopolist is forced to maintain a high quality of risk
management in order not to lose users to other providers. Additionally, open communication standards
enable a wider proliferation of knowledge on the transmission of transaction data. As communication
technology becomes generic knowledge, it is likely that market participants react faster and better on
systemic emergency events. However, contestability of the market may also bring along adverse aspects
such as the aforementioned race-to-the-bottom incentives for the provider. An e®ective no-bail-out com-
mitment by governments or central banks may prevent the monopolist from assuming himself to be
too-big-to-fail.
35We again limit ourselves to analyze the e±ciencies of model I as the ¯ndings hold also for the less extreme models in a
weaker manner.
255.4 Comparison of the systems
The three systems described above are all consistent systems that maximize social welfare in the sense
that an incremental deviation from the con¯guration of its elements would not lead to further improve-
ments. As such they are better than the current, ine±cient industry structure employed in the European
securities transaction industry which both fails to capture the static e±ciency bene¯ts from a full-blown
consolidation and the dynamic e±ciency gains from competitive fragmentation. In this section we com-
pare the three systems derived from our framework and evaluate their relative merits and drawbacks to
come to a conclusion which system policy makers in the EU should strive to implement. In particular we
pose the following questions:
² How robust are these three systems when small deviations from the optimal con¯guration occur
and how likely is a system to deteriorate into an inconsistent system that is ine±cient given the
micro-motives of the di®erent institutions?
² Which of these three system dominates the other two systems when social welfare is to be maximized,
i.e. which system is the global optimum?
Stability of the systems and the threat of ine±cient systems The system of a regulated monopoly
is very stable and not in danger of falling apart easily once its elements are con¯gured in a consistent way.
By its ownership of the infrastructure providing institutions or by the power it devolved to its regulating
institutions the government commits credibly to stay in this system. New entrants cannot upset this
system and the incumbent monopolist has only weak incentives to engage in innovative activities. The
stability itself puts a positive feedback into the system since long-range planning and routinization become
possible that lower the cost imposed by regulation.
The system is little prone to deteriorate into an ine±cient system: In many European countries
dominant regulated monopolies along the securities transaction value chain ensured that the underlying
economies of scale and scope could be reaped at the domestic level without incurring too big a social
welfare loss due to e±cient regulation. By striking the right balance between these costs, securities
trading, clearing and settlement in national markets is highly e±cient, at least from a static and systemic
point of view. The past has shown that such a system needs a very big shock - like the integration of
formerly apart ¯nancial markets into the single European one - to overcome its inertia.
The system of competitive fragmentation is not very stable and small deviations from the consistent
con¯guration can lead to a deterioration into an ine±cient setting. If, for example, too much uncoor-
dinated investments are undertaken, the problem of over-investing arises. If a bubble builds and subse-
26quently bursts due to any su±cient macroeconomic shock, it can force these investors to sell many assets
below their value. Many providers become insolvent and are forced to leave the industry. A consolidation
process is started by the institutions that are in a better position.
These institutions start to consolidate horizontally to achieve greater economies of scale and increase
the degree of static e±ciency. They also integrate vertically to safeguard this horizontal expansion and
to leverage the resulting market power. Since all institutions concentrate on getting ¯nancially sound
again, the rate of technological innovation drops, new entry looks less attractive and the whole system
can transire to one of the other systems or falls into ine±ciency if no regulation is introduced, to keep the
market contestable or if the ownership is reorganized to a more mutual structure (which is the less likely
possibility). The surviving institutions can extract too much of the economic rent and their monopoly
power is not compensated by a regulating institution.
The system of contestable monopolies is equally hard to sustain. A monopolist on one stage of the
securities transaction value chain for example, might be tempted to integrate forwards or backwards.
Such a merger of two dominant monopolies might look good at ¯rst sight: By integrating the two
institutions the communication between them can be streamlined and straight-through processing might
be facilitated to the bene¯t of the users. Open access is guaranteed by the acquiring institution and
formally assured by the small regulator. However, the realization in practice might look di®erent and
many potential entrants are deterred by the more entrenched position of the merged institution. This
protection induces the incumbent divert its e®orts towards rent-seeking and engage in investments in
the 'open' communication standard that slightly favors its own business. If regulation is not adjusted
accordingly towards a stronger regime, such an institution can lower the overall amount of economic rent
that is generated thereby decreasing social welfare. At the same time it can gain an economic rent that
is bigger than it would be in a consistently con¯gured system at the expense of a relatively larger loss in
the economic rents that the users enjoy.
Like the system of competitive fragmentation the system of contestable monopolies is prone to de-
teriorate when even small deviations from the consistent con¯guration occur. The micro-motives of the
infrastructure providing institutions will generally lead to a situation in which a monopoly prevails that
is entrenched by vertical integration, a proprietary communication standard and an ownership structure
that places too little weight on the bene¯t of the users and society as a whole. Such a mixture of di®erent
con¯gurations will not maximize overall welfare.
Evaluation of the systems and global optimum So far we have not discussed if one of the idealized
system is better than the others. Calculating an exact ¯gure for social welfare in each of the three systems
27is nearly impossible: Too many parameters would need to be measured and too many errors would be
made in measuring the e±ciency of the involved institutions. We therefore restrict ourselves to indications
only. Which of the three systems might be the global optimum that dominates the others? The system
of a regulated monopoly produces at an e±cient level so that economies of scale and scope can be reaped.
However, it fares poorly when dynamic aspects of e±ciency are taken into account. No investment
incentives are set and the cost of regulation or public ownership further decreases the overall welfare
generated by this system.
The system of competitive fragmentation scores especially high when these aspects of dynamic ef-
¯ciency are important. However, due to the small scale of the providing institutions too little of the
underlying economies are utilized. The system su®ers also from the coordination problem between the
many institutions so that too many duplicate and incompatible investments are undertaken. The system
of contestable monopolies does not have these drawbacks once con¯gured in a consistent way: The small
number of institutions deploys the underlying economies of scale and scope and the limited role of the
regulator ensures that these costs are kept to a minimum as well. The market stays open for new entrants
so that improvements due to innovations need not to be forgone.
This 'guesstimate' leads to the conclusion that the third system of contestable monopolies is the
best and should be implemented in the TCS industry in the European Union. A caveat however must
be applied since this system is of rather instable nature and prone to slide down towards an ine±cient
system of unregulated monopoly if not adjusted in a consistent way. Table 1 summarizes the merits and
drawbacks of the three systems.
6 The transformation of the securities transaction industry
The introduction of the Single European Market was a strong catalyst that upset the system of a reg-
ulated monopoly that many European countries had in place. Many features of the established system
were suddenly and simultaneously changed. By simply opening the markets and leaving everything else
unchanged, the result however is ine±cient. Too many inconsistent con¯gurations of important elements
are in place: Too many regulators increase the costs and thereby decrease social welfare. Publicly owned
or heavily regulated institutions do not have the incentives to make the right decisions. And previously
vertically integrated institutions can bar others from using parts of their infrastructure. Divergent ob-
jectives of the many regulators or even unhealthy competition between them decreases e±ciency even
further.
The response by many regulators was therefore to withdraw a bit and let the market mechanism
28Table 1: Comparison of the three idealized systems
work. The system in the securities industry in the European Union in the 1990s therefore had some
characteristics of the system of competitive fragmentation: The rate of innovations like automated trading
and the demutualization of exchanges increased dramatically and many new entrants tried to do business
in the industry. The total amount of new investments was high and duplication of investments occurred in
the process of battling for the dominant position in a segment of the market. The users were fully aware
of the costs imposed by the incompatible communication standards between the national institutions and
tried to shape the industry to their liking.
Now that the investment boom is over and the rate of technological progress has receded a bit, the
securities industry in the European Union is again at a crossroads. The rate of consolidation - horizontally
as well as vertically - remains high and many unsuccessful ventures were forced to close down and leave
the industry. New entrants that could keep up the pressure to innovate cannot be seen. The surviving
providers try to entrench their monopoly position by vertical integration and proprietary communication
standards.
It is an open question how and if their rent appropriation possibilities will be countered either by
tougher regulation that would put the European securities industry back to a system of a regulated
monopoly - although now at the European level - or whether the users of the infrastructure can ensure
together with a cut-down regulatory institution that the system of contestable monopolies can be reached
which is our policy advice. It is very crucial that a consistent con¯guration of key parameters is achieved
29to avoid a system with a quasi-unregulated monopoly which might be preferred by infrastructure providers
but certainly not by the users and society at large.
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